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Abstract In this paper, we analyze the distributional properties of the bal-
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assets, profit rates and growth rates using a data set of 2818 Icelandic firms
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tribution seems to be robust w.r.t. a boom-bust cycle of the economy as well
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private ownership. Another important finding is that the profit rates, or return
on assets, of Icelandic firms follow a Laplace like distribution similar to U.S.
firms. Additionally, we identified deviations from the distributional regulari-
ties, namely the power law behavior of firms’ size and laplacian distributions of
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1 Introduction
Firms drive economic growth through investment and innovation and are an
important part of any economy. In this paper, we analyze the distributional
properties of the balance sheets of Icelandic firms during the period 2000-2009.
First we analyze a measure of firms size, namely the level of total assets, then
we consider the growth rates of firms’ total assets, and finally we look at profit
rates, defined as earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets.
It is worth noting that the Iceland economy, for its small dimension and the
recent boom-bust cycle, is a peculiar and interesting case study for testing the
presence of the distributional properties that have been recently described in
the literature, both for US (Axtell 2001, Podobnik et al. 2010 and Alfarano
et al. 2012) and Italian (Bottazzi and Secchi 2006 and Cirillo 2010) firms,
namely power law behavior of firm size and Laplacian distribution of firms
growth and profit rates. In the last decade, the Icelandic economy witnessed
a dramatic increase and decrease in asset prices as well as a housing bubble.
Twelve month inflation rates reached 20%, the currency, the Icelandic Kronur
(ISK), lost about half of its value w.r.t. the Euro in 2008, and almost the
entire banking system collapsed in the space of a week in early October 2008.
Furthermore, most of the firms in Iceland are privately owned and are not
traded on any stock exchange, unlike data sets used in most studies of firms
dynamics known to the authors. Therefore, it is interesting to analyze whether
distributional properties of firms size, profit and growth rates are robust w.r.t.
a boom-bust cycle of a small open economy inhabited mostly by privately
owned firms.
Analysis of the measures of firms’ size have a long history in the liter-
ature. Since the seminal work of Gibrat (1931) it has been known that the
distribution of firms size, proxied by the number of employees, follows a right
skew distribution. According to Gibrat’s law, the growth rate of firms is inde-
pendent of its size, giving rise to a log-normal distribution. It seems that the
log-normal distribution does not account for the power law behavior in the
tail of the firm size distribution. From a historical perspective, the model in-
troduced by Champernowne (1953) with the presence of a minimum firm size1
can account for the power law behavior in the tail. The heavy-tailed distribu-
tion found for firm size has been modeled in various ways, see De Wit (2005)
for an overview. Perhaps the best known of these methods is the multiplicative
process (Simon and Bonini 1958, and Ijiri and Simon 1974), summarized by
the saying “the rich get richer”. Recent models of heavy-tailed distributions of
various size related phenomena include the model of Atalay et al. (2011) of a
buyer-seller network for US production firms and the random group formation
model of Baek et al. (2011). The power-law behavior of the upper tail of firm’s
size distribution has been verified for various periods and economies, e.g. for
U.S. firms by Axtell (2001), Podobnik et al. (2010) and Simon and Bonini
1 The original model by Champernowne has been constructed to account for the distri-
bution of income. However the basic mechanism can also be adapted to the firms growth
process.
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(1958), and for Italian firms by Cirillo (2010) and Cirillo and Hu¨sler (2009).
The recent contribution of Gabaix (2009) reviews both the empirical literature
of power law behavior in economic and social systems as well as several classes
of stochastic models to generate such a scaling behavior.
In a recent paper, Alfarano et al. (2012) show that the profit rate distri-
bution of large publicly traded US companies is well described by a Laplace
distribution. Using the statistical equilibrium approach, they relate the emer-
gence of the Laplace distribution to the notion of classical competition. The
same tent like distribution has been found to fit reasonably well growth rates of
firms, see e.g. Bottazzi and Secchi (2006) and Alfarano and Milakovic (2008).
A further objective of this work has been to gather important stylized
facts and descriptive statistics of the Icelandic economy to be used for the
validation and calibration of agent-based macroeconomic models, which re-
cently have been recognized (Farmer and Foley 2009) as an alternative to
traditional dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, see e.g.
Smets et al. (2002), that have been used by economic policy makers during
the past decade. These new agent-based models, e.g. EURACE (Cincotti et
al. 2010 and Raberto et al. 2011), rely on stylized facts of the economy for
calibration and validation.
In section two we will give a detailed description of our data set, while in
sections three and four we will analyze the distributional properties of total
assets, used as a measure of firm size, and profit and growth rates of Icelandic
firms respectively. In section five we present our results.
2 Data set
The data set used in this study is public information attained from annual
reports of Icelandic firms collected by the Icelandic Internal Revenue Direc-
torate (RSK). The RSK does not give access to digital (computerized) data.
Therefore the authors turned to a third party data provider, Creditinfo hf.2.
Data from 2818 Icelandic firms were collected for the years 2000-2009 giving
a total of 11084 observations. The firms in the data set have minimum assets
of 100 million ISK3 and belong to various industries such as manufacturing,
service, retail and fishing. The data set does not contain banks, insurance firms
or other financial institutions. In Iceland only a very limited number of firms
are listed on the Icelandic stock exchange, so the vast majority of the firms in
the data set are privately owned firms.
When analyzing data of firms profit and growth rates we are interested
in relatively large, long lived firms for the sake of consistency with previous
work (Alfarano et al. 2012 and Bottazzi and Secchi 2006). To get this subset of
firms we select the firms present in the year 2000 and gather all observations
2 Creditinfo hf. specializes in providing credit information about Icelandic firms.,
http://www.creditinfo.is
3 The average exchange rate of the ISK has been approx. 162 ISK for 1 EUR in April
2011
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Year No. obs. Mean TA No. obs. Long lived Mean TA, Long lived
2000 518 1.272.575 518 1.272.575
2001 598 1.309.588 421 1.635.462
2002 726 1.143.999 431 1.601.477
2003 870 1.057.349 441 1.513.737
2004 1007 1.160.869 430 1.977.509
2005 1263 1.385.675 424 2.590.019
2006 1618 1.296.920 415 2.737.960
2007 1971 1.643.282 426 3.961.210
2008 1889 1.744.903 382 3.981.384
2009 624 1.315.863 136 1.836.308
Aggregated 11084 1.404.404 4024 2.298.303
Table 1 Columns two and three represent the whole data set while columns four and five
represent long lived firms. All monetary values given are in thousands of ISK.
for these firms in the years 2001-2009. This will leave out any firms established
after the year 2000 and since all firms in the data set were active at the end
of the period considered, 2000-2009, give us a good subset of long lived firms
in Iceland.
Our data set is comprised of 5-6% of all firms in Iceland, representing about
half of the total assets of firms in Iceland. When considering long lived firms,
they represent about 1.3% of the total number of firms in Iceland with about
one quarter of the total assets. Table 1 shows some descriptive statistics of the
data set, both w.r.t all firms as well as long lived firms.
There are some peculiarities in the Icelandic data that need to be noted.
Firstly, according to Icelandic law (no. 696/19964) revenues are defined as the
sum of revenues from core operations and other revenues. No further details
are given for revenues, e.g. sales are not given explicitly. Secondly, firms in
Iceland can turn in contracted forms of the annual report (law no. 694/1996)
if they fulfill certain conditions5. If firms hand in contracted forms of the annual
report no information is given about revenues and costs, while the difference
of the two, defined as earnings before interest and taxes, EBIT , is given for
all firms in the data set. Unfortunately it seems that firms in Iceland have a
tendency to turn in the contracted form of the annual report if they possibly
can. As a result revenues and cost are difficult to analyze. Thirdly, although
the RSK can enforce fines for not handing in annual reports it has not done
so in the past. In some cases firms have taken advantage of this and not filed
annual reports with the RSK, with the end result of missing observations in
our data set.
These peculiarities aside, the data set gives the opportunity to study the
distributional properties of firms balance sheet entries during a boom-bust
cycle of a small open economy.
4 All Icelandic law can be found on-line at: http://www.althingi.is
5 These conditions are mostly related to size measures, small firms with little turnover can
file contracted forms of the annual report. The law also allows firms to file contracted forms
of the annual report for reasons of competition, i.e. if the firms can argue that reporting full
annual report might reversely affect competition.
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Fig. 1 Zipf plot of TA, disaggregated for each year, shown on a log-log scale. The variables
exhibit classic power-law behavior.
3 Total Assets
One of the benchmarks for any measure of firm size is that it is well described
by a power-law distribution. Firm size is often measured by the number of
employees it has, by the amount of sales it generates or, as in our case, by
the book value of total assets (TA). Note that when analyzing TA we use the
entire data set.
We consider a power-law probability density function (PDF) defined as:
f(x|β) ∼ x−β (1)
Using this PDF of the power-law distribution we can estimate the exponent,
β, using ordinary least squares regression by:
βˆ =
∑N
i=1(log ri − log rˆ) log TAi∑N
i=1(log ri − log rˆ)
(2)
Where r is the ordered rank of firms from the largest to the smallest, N is
the total number of samples and rˆ is the mean of the rank. The error can be
estimated in the standard way.
It seems from viewing figure 1 that there is a power-law regime in the Zipf
plot of TA of Icelandic firms. Table 2 shows the OLS estimated exponent, β,
for each year present in the data set as well as the estimated standard error
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Year Exponent, β Exponent, βKS KS statistic
2000 1.25(0.04) 1.27(0.04) 0.03
2001 1.27(0.04) 1.30(0.04) 0.02
2002 1.22(0.04) 1.26(0.04) 0.02
2003 1.19(0.03) 1.24(0.03) 0.03
2004 1.21(0.03) 1.27(0.03) 0.02
2005 1.24(0.03) 1.28(0.03) 0.03
2006 1.22(0.03) 1.28(0.03) 0.03
2007 1.27(0.02) 1.35(0.02) 0.03
2008 1.27(0.02) 1.35(0.02) 0.04
2009 1.30(0.04) 1.32(0.04) 0.04
Table 2 The exponent, β, is estimated for each year in the data set using eq. 2, the standard
error is shown in parentheses. We also provide an estimate of the exponent minimizing the
Kolmogorov-Smirmov (hereby KS) statistic, βKS . The last column shows the KS statistic
calculated using βKS for the exponent. Bolded values of the exponents, β and βKS , in the
table represent instances where we cannot reject the hypothesis that the data comes from
the power-law distribution, given a 1% confidence level.
shown in parentheses. The exponent, β, is relatively stable from one year to
the next, ranging from 1.19 to 1.30 when using the standard OLS estima-
tion. We also provide an estimation of the exponent found by minimizing the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) statistic, denoted βKS . The fluctuation is similar
as before, between 1.24-1.35. Bolded values of the exponents, β and βKS , in
table 2, represent instances where we cannot reject the hypothesis that the
data come from the power-law distribution, given a 1% confidence level6. Un-
fortunately, we do not have data for number of employees or sales, previously
used as measures of firm size by Axtell (2001). Our results can though be com-
pared with what Podobnik et al. (2010) found for NYSE firms; they report an
exponent of about 1.4 for book value of assets for the years 2007-2009, which
is consistent with our findings for β and βKS .
According to the KS statistic, we can only reject the null hypothesis that
TA follows a power-law distribution, using the exponent βKS , during the peak
of the economic boom in Iceland, 2006-2008. One possible explanation for
this is the fact that an influx of relatively small firms, 0.1% of TA w.r.t. the
maximum TA of each year, is seen in the data set of Icelandic firms during
this period. This influx starts in the early years of the boom, 2003-2005, but
is most apparent during the peak of the boom. These relatively small firms
do not seem to be captured by the statistical equilibrium of the power-law
distribution, thus rejecting the null hypothesis that the data is well described
by a power-law distribution. In fact, if these very small firms are removed form
the data set we cannot reject the null hypothesis that TA follows a power-law
distribution, using the exponent βKS and 1% confidence level, for any year in
the data set7.
6 The critical values are obtained from Goldstein et al. (2004)
7 Analysis not included in table 2 but available in additional material upon request.
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4 Statistical analysis of profit rates and growth rates
Profit rates, also named as return on assets or ROA, are computed by dividing
the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT ) by total assets (TA). Profit
rates are an important measure of firms performance and are inherently linked
to growth rates because many firms use internal financing to finance growth
opportunities, i.e. they use part of their profits to finance investment instead of
issuing new debt or equity (external financing), as rationalized by the Pecking
Order Theory (Myers 1984). Notice, however, that profit rates are defined
as the ratio of a flow (yearly operating gross earnings) over a stock (total
asset), while growth rates are usually defined as log differences over a given
time interval of a firm size measure (typically yearly sales, total assets or
number of employees). Profit rates and growth rates have been shown to be
well described by a Laplace distribution, see e.g. Alfarano et al. (2012) and
Bottazzi and Secchi (2006). Even if profit and growth rates retain the same
functional form of their empirical distributions, they might not be linked by a
trivial relationship. In this section, we want to explore whether the empirically
identified distributional regularity of Laplacian profit and growth rates hold
for Icelandic firms.
4.1 Theoretical framework
In the literature on industrial dynamics several theoretical models have been
introduced to reproduce the Laplacian functional form of firms growth rates,
for instance Bottazzi and Secchi (2006), Stanley et al. (1996) and Delli Gatti
et al. (2005). Bottazzi and Secchi (2006), in particular, empirically tested the
Laplacian hypothesis by introducing a more general distributional class, the
Subbotin distribution, also known as the generalized exponential-power distri-
bution (see eq. 4 below), and by showing that the nested Laplace distribution
cannot be rejected in favor of the more general Subbotin distribution for Italian
manufacturing firms.
A very general framework for the Laplacian hypothesis of profit rates dis-
tribution comes out of a statistical equilibrium model introduced by Alfarano
et al. (2012) and its subsequent empirical applications. More precisely, they
encode the “tendency for equalization” of profit rates due to the competitive
process among firms in a moment constraint of the underlying statistical dis-
tribution of profit rates. They propose the following very general measure of
dispersion:
σ = α
√
E [|x−m|α] , (3)
where m is a measure of central tendency of the underlying distribution8.
Notice that for α = 2, the previous definition is the standard deviation, while
8 Note that the measure of central tendency is the general expression to characterize a
focal value of a distribution. For instance, mean, median and mode are possible alternatives
of measures of central tendency.
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Year mMean mMed mKS KS statistic
2000 0.058 (0.005) 0.051 0.057 0.93
2001 0.062 (0.005) 0.060 0.059 0.74
2002 0.057 (0.005) 0.053 0.053 0.48
2003 0.065 (0.006) 0.055 0.062 0.99
2004 0.071 (0.005) 0.058 0.065 0.97
2005 0.085 (0.007) 0.061 0.073 1.24
2006 0.103 (0.006) 0.083 0.091 1.09
2007 0.097 (0.007) 0.067 0.081 1.48
2008 0.09 (0.01) 0.086 0.093 0.71
2009 0.092 (0.008) 0.079 0.062 0.76
Table 3 The table shows the estimation of the measure of central tendency for the profit
rate distribution, performed with three different estimators: the mean, the median and by
minimizing the KS statistics. The associated errors for all three methods is the error of
the mean computed with the usual standard method. The bold estimates indicate that the
Laplace benchmark cannot be rejected at 1% significance level. The critical value at 1%
significance level is 1.065, according to Puig and Stephens (2000).
for the case α = 1, it coincides with the absolute mean deviation. Employing
the Maximum Entropy Principle, it is possible to link up the previous moment
constrain to an equilibrium distribution, which turns out to be the Subbotin
distribution:
f(x|m,σ, α) = 1
2σα1/αΓ (1 + 1/α)
exp
(
− 1
α
∣∣∣∣x−mσ
∣∣∣∣α) , (4)
where m is the location parameter, σ is the scale parameter and α is the shape
parameter. Since the Laplace distribution is nested in eq. (4) for a value of
the shape parameter α = 1, the Subbotin distribution can be employed to test
for the Laplace distribution of profit and growth rates at various aggregate
levels. In various papers in the literature on industrial dynamics (see for in-
stance Bottazzi and Secchi 2006), the estimation of the shape parameter of
f(x|m,σ, α) turned out to be “close” to one in the vast majority of empirical
distributions of firms’ profit and growth rates. However in several cases a max-
imum likelihood test rejects the Laplace in favor of the Subbotin distribution.
We can consider the Laplace distribution a sort of first approximation model
alternative to the Gaussian. The Gaussian distribution can be, in fact, em-
ployed as a reference distributional hypothesis of growth or profit rates under
the absence of economic interactions among firms. Deviations from the Gaus-
sian distribution indicate the presence of correlations among firms, imprint of
some kind of direct or indirect economic interactions. For instance, Bottazzi
and Secchi (2006) have derived the Laplacian distribution of firm growth rates
out of a simple model of competition among firms in an increasing return to
scale environment.
4.2 Empirical analysis of profit rates
Contrary to the previously analyzed data set of profit rates mainly based on
publicly traded US firms (see Alfarano et. al. 2012 and references therein), our
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Fig. 2 The figure shows the three different measures of central tendency estimated for each
year in the data set. Note the growing asymmetry of m during the boom in Iceland (2005-
2007), which coincides with the rejection of the Laplace distribution benchmark for profit
rates of Icelandic firms.
data set consists of mostly privately owned firms in what can be considered
a prototypical example of a small open economy. In this section, we want to
analyze to which extent the Laplace distribution can do a good job in fitting
the profit rates of Icelandic firms. In order to do so, we compute the goodness-
of-fit using a KS statistics of the Laplace distribution in describing the data.
In order to estimate the parameter m, we use three different measures of
central tendencies: the mean, mMean, the median, mMed, and the value which
minimizes the KS statistics, mKS . As a first approximation, we have associated
to mMed and mKS the same error as for mMean, which is computed with the
standard method. The scale parameter σ is computed using the formula of the
maximum likelihood for a Laplace distribution:
σˆ =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|xi − mˆ| , (5)
providing for mˆ the pertinent value, namely mMean, mMed or mKS . Table 3
summarize the results of the estimation for each year in our sample. The bold
value of the estimates of m indicates that the Laplace distribution cannot be
rejected following the KS statistic at a 1% significance level. To have an idea
of the values of the KS statistics, we show in the last column its value for
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mKS .
9 A clear-cut conclusion of our analysis is that the Laplace constitutes
a good benchmark for the distribution of profit rates of Icelandic firms. In
order to have an idea of the performance of the Laplace in fitting the empir-
ical data, Figure 3 shows the profit rate distributions disaggregated per year.
The Laplacian hypothesis for the profit rate distribution of long-lived firms is,
then, robust if we consider a large economy like the US one, see Alfarano et. al.
(2012), or a prototypical small open economy like the one of Iceland. Notice,
however, that the rejection of the Laplace benchmark seems to be related the
years of the economic boom (2005-2007), which coincides with an emergence
of an underlying asymmetric distribution of profit rates. Table 3 and Figure 2
show in fact a significant positive difference between mean and median during
the bubble period. If we make the hypothesis that the symmetric Laplace dis-
tribution is a kind of statistical equilibrium distribution which characterized a
phase of ‘equilibrated’ growth of an economy, our tentative hypothesis is that
in periods of high growth (bubble), the distribution of profit rates is charac-
terized by a significant asymmetry. Interestingly and some how surprisingly, in
the period immediately after the bubble (2008-2009), the Laplace distribution
cannot be rejected, showing a fast realignment with the symmetric Laplace
benchmark. Our hypothesis should be tested in different economies that in the
last decade experienced a similar behavior of the Icelandic economy, namely
high growth and subsequent crisis period, for instance the Spanish and Irish
economies.
4.3 Empirical analysis of growth rates
In this section we present the empirical analysis of growth rates of Icelandic
firms. The definition of annual growth rate of a firm i is given by:
gi,t = ln
(
TAi,t+1
TAi,t
)
, (6)
where TAi,t are the total assets of the firm i at time t. It has been repeat-
edly shown that the distribution of firm growth rates can be conveniently
described by a Laplace distribution (for instance Bottazzi and Secchi (2006)
and reference therein). Table 4 shows the results of the estimation exercise
of the Laplace distribution using the annual growth rates of icelandic firms.
Moreover, Figure 4 shows the yearly disaggregated growth rates distributions
and their fitted Laplace. Contrary to the profit rates, the Laplace distribution
shows a worst performance in describing the empirical probability density of
growth rates. The laplacian null hypothesis is, in fact, rejected in almost all
cases according to the KS test. Following our analysis of profit rates, we em-
ploy different methods for the estimation of the measure of central tendency.
Interestingly, its statistics seems to have the same pattern as observed for the
9 The critical value at 1% significance level is 1.065, according to Puig and Stephens
(2000). The typical critical value for the KS test cannot be used here since the parameters
of the Laplace distribution are estimated from the data sample.
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Fig. 3 The figure shows the empirical PDF of profit rates (dots) and fitted Laplace dis-
tribution (dashed line), using mMed as the measure of central tendency, of long lived firms
disaggregated by year shown on a semi-log scale for the years 2000-2008. The dominance of
the tent shape, characteristic of the Laplace distribution, is clear.
profit rates, namely during the booming period the value of the KS statistics
for the different definitions10 of m increases, which coincides with the evident
asymmetry of the distribution, signaled by the significant difference between
mean and median.
Table 4 includes the yearly inflation rate so to let the reader compute the
real growth rate. One can then observe a negative real growth rate in the
period 2001-02 (related to the crash after the dot.com bubble) and in the
crash of 2008 and 2009. To a negative real growth corresponds a significantly
positive “average” profit rate, which can probably be linked to a shrinking
phase of firms in order to increase profitability.
All in all, even if the two unconditional distribution of profit and growth
rates might be more or less satisfactorily described by the underlying bench-
mark distribution, namely the Laplace, they exhibits some remarkable differ-
ences. The dispersion of the profit rates is much smaller than the growth rates
(which is apparent from a simple comparison between Figures 3 and 4), and,
more interestingly, it seems that the average profit rate is much less volatile
than the average growth rate (see Tables 3 and 4). It seems that there is a much
10 Notice that in the Table 4, we have shown just the KS statistics for mKS . The other
values are in additional material upon request.
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Fig. 4 The figure shows the empirical PDF of growth rates (dots) and fitted Laplace dis-
tribution (dashed line), using gMed as the measure of central tendency, of long lived firms
disaggregated by year shown on a semi-log scale for the years 2000-2009.
Year gMean gMed gKS KS statistics pi
2000-01 0.11 (0.01) 0.08 0.09 1.21 0.06
2001-02 0.00 (0.02) -0.02 0.00 0.85 0.05
2002-03 0.05 (0.02) 0.02 0.06 1.36 0.02
2003-04 0.11 (0.02) 0.07 0.10 0.85 0.03
2004-05 0.18 (0.02) 0.10 0.15 1.51 0.04
2005-06 0.14 (0.02) 0.11 0.14 1.35 0.06
2006-07 0.16 (0.02) 0.10 0.13 1.16 0.05
2007-08 0.06 (0.02) 0.05 0.05 0.48 0.13
2008-09 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 0.02 0.44 0.12
Table 4 The table shows the estimation of the measure of central tendency for the growth
rates distribution, performed with three different estimators: the mean, the median and by
minimizing the KS statistics. The associated errors for all three methods is the error of
the mean computed with the usual standard method. The bold estimates indicate that the
Laplace benchmark cannot be rejected at 1% significance level.
higher persistence in the profitability of firms than in the way they manage
their assets. It might be an indication that the driving force of the dynamics
of firms can be found in their profitability and not in the way they grow or
shrink over time. In future work we will analyze more in detailed in how far
profit and growth rates can be considered proxies and in how far they exhibit
different statistical properties.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have verified that one size measure of Icelandic firms, namely
total assets, follows a power-law distribution, with an exponent above unity,
during the period 2000-2009, in line with previous contribution from the per-
tinent literature. Although, we find a period within the data set, 2006-2008,
which coincides with the peak of the economic boom in Iceland where we re-
ject the null hypothesis that the data follows a power-law distribution. This
deviation seems to be related to an inflow of small firms during the booming
period of the economy.
Using a very general framework for the Laplacian hypothesis of profit rates
distribution introduced by Alfarano et al. (2012) we have shown that the
Laplace distribution is a good benchmark for the distribution of profit rates,
even in a very small economy where most firms are privately owned as is
the case in Iceland. The exception is, as with the power-law distribution of
firms size, during the peak of the economic boom. The symmetric Laplace
distribution can be thought of as a kind of statistical equilibrium distribution
which characterizes a phase of equilibrated growth of an economy. Our ten-
tative hypothesis is that in periods of high growth (bubble) of the economy,
this equilibrium is broken in favor of a distribution characterized by significant
asymmetry.
Contrary to the profit rates, the laplacian benchmark for growth rates
seems not to adequately describe the empirical probability density of growth
rates of Icelandic firms. The laplacian null hypothesis is, in fact, rejected in
almost all cases according to the KS test. Following our analysis of profit rates,
we employ different methods for the estimation of the measure of central ten-
dency. Interestingly, its statistics seems to have the same pattern as observed
for the profit rates, namely during the booming period the value of the KS
statistics for the different definitions of m increases, which coincides with the
evident asymmetry of the distribution, signaled by the significant difference
between mean and median.
Even if the two unconditional distribution of profit and growth rates might
be more or less satisfactorily described by the underlying benchmark distribu-
tion, namely the Laplace, they exhibit some remarkable differences. It seems
that there is a much higher persistence in the profitability of firms than in the
way they manage their assets. It might be an indication that the driving force
of the dynamics of firms can be found in their profitability and not in the way
they grow or shrink.
In future work we will analyze in more detail in how far profit and growth
rates can be considered proxies and in how far they exhibit different statistical
properties. Additionally, since we observe deviations from the typically iden-
tified distributional properties during a high growth of an economy, we can
tentatively state that in period of booming, some distributional stylized facts
might not hold. Our hypothesis should be confirmed analyzing other booming
European economies, like Spanish and Irish for instance.
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